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SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MARCH 12 MEETING WITH MOROCCAN
FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA: MIDDLE EAST

1. SUMMARY: DURING MARCH 12 MEETING, SECRETARY DESCRIBED
PRINCIPAL ISSUES EXPECTED SURFACE IN BEGIN'S TALKS IN
WASHINGTON. HE SEVERELY CRITICIZED PLO FOR PREVIOUS DAY'S
TERRORIST ATTACK IN ISRAEL AND INCREASINGLY NEGATIVE AT-
TITUDE TOWARD PEACE PROCESS. WHILE VOICING SUPPORT FOR
SADAT, BOUCETTA INSISTED PLO MUST BE BROUGHT INTO PEACE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 066284

PROCESS AND BLAMED ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE FOR CURRENT
IMPASSE. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED CONTINUED EFFORTS WORK FOR
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. SECRETARY INITIATED SECOND MEETING WITH BOUCETTA WITH
DISCUSSION ON MIDDLE EAST (SEE SEPTELS FOR EXCHANGES OTHER
TOPICS). DESCRIBING MARCH 11 TERRORIST INCIDENT AS DE-

PLORABLE, SECRETARY SAID U.S. JUDGED IT WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. U.S. SINCERELY HOPED ISRAELI RETALIATION WOULD BE LIMITED. WE WERE ALL CONCERNED THAT CYCLE OF VIOLENT ACTION AND VIOLENT REACTION WOULD MAKE PEACE PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT. SECRETARY TOLD FONMIN U.S. HAD URGED ISRAELIS TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT.

3. TURNING TO BEGIN VISIT, SECRETARY SAID PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL DELAYED ONE WEEK. WHEN BEGIN IS IN WASHINGTON THERE WOULD BE THREE CRITICAL ISSUES. FIRST WOULD BE INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AS INCLUDING ALL FRONTS, WHICH HAS BEEN U.S. INTERPRETATION SINCE 1967 AND ALSO THAT OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT UNTIL VERY RECENTLY. SECRETARY SAID THIS INTERPRETATION IS FUNDAMENTAL TO POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT TO END ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

4. SECOND CRITICAL ISSUE WILL BE RESOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, INCLUDING PROSPECTS FOR PEOPLE OF WEST BANK AND GAZA TO PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE. U.S. THINKS WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS THROUGH LANGUAGE U.S. USED AT ASWAN. SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVES SADAT WILL AGREE, EVEN THOUGH EGYPTIAN PREFER TERM SELF-DETERMINATION. IT IS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH ONLY POSSIBLE, THAT BEGIN CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE. U.S. WILL DISCUSS WITH BEGIN KIND OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE POSSIBLE LEADING UP TO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 066284

AN ULTIMATE DECISION REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO JORDAN. CONTINUING, SECRETARY EXPLAINED U.S. RECOGNIZES POSSIBILITY OF FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD DURING WHICH WEST BANKERS THROUGH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES, JORDANIANS, AND HOPEFULLY ISRAELIS COULD WORK OUT MODALITIES OF HOW A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE ACHIEVED. U.S. THINKS IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD UPON WHAT BEGIN CALLS SELF-RULE TO DEVELOP SOME FORM OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERVAL. SELF-RULE PROPOSAL ITSELF CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE AS SUCH TO ARABS BUT COULD BE A BASIS TO WORK TOWARD SOMETHING ELSE. DURING THIS INTERIM PERIOD SOME ISRAELI TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN IN CANTONMENTS ON HIGH GROUNDS OF WEST BANK. SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVES SADAT REALIZES THIS AND IS WILLING DISCUSS IT.

5. FINAL CRITICAL ISSUE, SECRETARY CONTINUED, WOULD BE THE SETTLEMENTS. THIS IS CRUCIAL FOR AGREEMENT ON SINAI. IT WILL REQUIRE DECISION ON HIGHEST ISRAELI POLITICAL LEVEL, AND MOST U.S. CAN HOPE FOR NOW IS THAT THERE WILL BE NO MORE SETTLEMENTS PENDING FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. U.S. BELIEVES STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. U.S. POSITION IS THAT ESTABLISH-

MENT OF SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY IS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. THIS IS A DEEP POLITICAL PROBLEM IN ISRAEL, WHICH BEGIN CAN RESOLVE ONLY WITH STRENGTH AND COURAGE. U.S. IS NOT SURE WHAT WILL COME OUT OF DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE.

6. RESPONDING, BOUCETTA SAID MOROCCO'S POSITION ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT HAD COST IT GREATLY WITHIN ARAB WORLD

AND EVEN DOMESTICALLY. THE WEEKEND TERRORIST INCIDENT HAD SHOWN THAT SENTIMENT CONTINUES TO BE EXACERBATED. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THERE WOULD NOT BE FURTHER INCIDENTS OR REPRAISALS AND CRITICIZED AS INTRANSIGENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT POSITION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 066284

7. FOCUSING ON SADAT INITIATIVE, BOUCETTA SAID MOROCCO'S POSITION WAS NOT SENTIMENTAL BUT PRODUCT OF HIS COUNTRY'S DESIRE FOR A JUST AND REASONABLE PEACE. SADAT'S EFFORTS CONSISTENT WITH 1974 RABAT SUMMIT'S INSISTENCE THAT THERE BE EVACUATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN ENTITY VIA SELF-DETERMINATION, AND NO SEPARATE PEACE. UNFORTUNATELY, ON ISRAELI SIDE THERE HAD BEEN NO UNDERSTANDING OF SCOPE OF SADAT'S GESTURE. ISRAELIS' INTRANSIGENCE PROVOKED INCIDENTS. REBUFFING SADAT WOULD ISOLATE HIM WITHIN ARAB WORLD. ISRAELIS' POSITION ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BIZARRE, UNACCEPTABLE, AND INCONSISTENT WITH PEACE SETTLEMENT.

8. FONMIN SAID MOROCCO MAINTAINS CONTACT, AND HE DOES PERSONALLY, WITH PLO LEADERS. PALESTINIANS CANNOT BE IGNORED IN PEACE PROCESS, AND PLO ITSELF MUST BE INVOLVED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT. TURNING TO SADAT, FONMIN SAID HIS FURTHER ISOLATION WOULD HINDER CHANCES FOR PEACE. IF THERE WERE LESS ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE JORDANIANS AND POSSIBLY EVEN SYRIANS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN PEACE PROCESS.

9. RESPONDING TO BOUCETTA ON PLO, SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED PLO HAD MADE GRAVE MISTAKE UNDERTAKING TERRORIST INCIDENT ON PREVIOUS DAY; IT HAD BEEN ONE OF MOST SERIOUS BLUNDERS ARAFAT COULD HAVE MADE. IT WAS TRAGIC AND STUPID ACT WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN U.S. AND WOULD LESSEN GREATLY ANY CHANCE FOR PLO AS SUCH TO PLAY ANY PART IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. BOUCETTA REPLIED THAT NO ACT WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH, EVEN WHEN UNDERTAKEN IN DESPERATION, COULD HAVE JUSTIFICATION OR SUPPORT. BUT IN A SITUATION AS COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT AS MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 066284

LEM FOCUS MUST BE KEPT ON ENTIRE PROBLEM AND NOT DEFLECTED BY PARTICULAR ACTS. HE REPEATED THAT PLO MUST BE BROUGHT INTO PEACE PROCESS, TO WHICH SECRETARY REPLIED THAT PLO HAS BEEN AGAINST PROCESS, A FACT WHICH HE KNEW HAD WORRIED SADAT. BOUCETTA SAID THAT HE WOULD TELL SADAT NOT TO ABANDON HOPE OF BRINGING PLO INTO PEACE PROCESS IF CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES FULFILLED. MOROCCO REMAINS HOPEFUL, HE CONTINUED, BUT ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE MAKES SADAT'S TASK DIFFICULT, AND PLO LEADERS IN DAMASCUS AND LEBANON ARE NOT ABLE ACT WITH ENTIRELY FREE HANDS.

10. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT PLO'S UNWILLINGNESS SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON ISSUES SUCH AS RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES WAS UNHELPFUL. PLO LEADERS DO NOT EVEN HAVE A COMMON POSITION--THEY SAY ONE THING ONE DAY AND ANOTHER THE FOLLOWING. BOUCETTA THEN OPINED THAT IF ISRAELIS SHOW REASONABLE ATTITUDE IT IS POSSIBLE PLO CAN BE BROUGHT INTO NEGOTIATIONS. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT TREND OF PLO IS NEGATIVE, AND HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THOSE CLOSE TO PLO COULD NOT PERSUADE PLO TO HALT ACTIONS MAKING IT UNLIKELY PLO WOULD PLAY ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS. SECRETARY PLEDGED U.S. WOULD DO ALL IT COULD PREVENT TALKS FROM BREAKING DOWN. BOUCETTA SAID MOROCCO WOULD DO ALL IT COULD AS WELL BUT COUNTED ON U.S. TO CHECK ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. VANCE

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